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Although the literature on the influence of memory on decisions is well developed,
research on the effects of decision making on memory is rather sparse and scattered.
Choice-supportive misremembering (i.e., misremembering choice-related information
that boosts the chosen option and/or demotes the foregone options) has been observed
in several studies and has the potential to affect future choices. Nonetheless, no attempt
has been made to review the relevant literature, categorize the different types of choice-
supportive misremembering observed, and critically appraise the existing evidence
and proposed explanations. Thus, starting from a new theoretically motivated and
empirically grounded taxonomy, we review the current research. Our taxonomy classifies
choice-supportive misremembering into four conceptually distinct types: misattribution
is when information is attributed to the wrong source, fact distortion when the facts
are remembered in a distorted manner, false memory when items that were not
part of the original decision scenarios are remembered as presented and, finally,
selective forgetting is when information is selectively forgotten. After assessing the
impact of various potentially moderating factors, we evaluate the evidence for each
type of misremembering and conclude that the support for the phenomenon is solid
in relation to misattribution when recognition memory is assessed, but significantly
weaker for the other three types, and when other memory tests are used to assess
memory. Finally, we review the cognitive and emotional explanations proposed for
choice-supportive misremembering in the light of the available evidence and identify
the main gaps in the current knowledge and the more promising avenues for future
research.
Keywords: decision making, episodic memory, choice-supportive memory, positivity bias, misattribution, fact
distortion, false memory, selective forgetting
INTRODUCTION
Time and memory are true artists; they remold reality nearer to the heart’s desire
(John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 1950).
Decision-making processes have been widely studied both in basic research and in applied
contexts, with a significant part of recent research concerning the impact of memory processes
and memory-related biases on decisions (see e.g., Dougherty et al., 2003; Tomlinson et al.,
2011; Del Missier et al., 2013, 2015; Hoffmann et al., 2014). Despite this interest in the
relationships between memory and decision making, only a limited number of studies have
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investigated how decision making affects memory, and, more
specifically, how the act of choosing and the actual choice
one has made influence subsequent memory of the options
(e.g., Mather and Johnson, 2000; Mather et al., 2000, 2003).
Although the issue of choice-supportive misremembering has
both theoretical interest for cognitive and decision scientists
and applied implications for practitioners in a variety of fields,
research has been sparse and non-systematic and a unifying
review is currently lacking. Moreover, each relevant paper tends
to focus mainly on one of the different types of misremembering,
but there has been no overarching attempt to clarify the categories
into which such systematic distortions may be divided and their
relationships. Finally, for some of these effects, results are not
fully consistent across studies and diverse explanations have been
proposed.
Given this state of affairs, the present review has two aims: (1)
to introduce a new taxonomy useful for understanding choice-
supportive memory effects and their underlying processes;
(2) to review the literature on choice-supportive memory
and appraise the degree of support for the different aspects
of the phenomenon and for the existing explanations. We
will start by proposing a new theoretically motivated and
empirically grounded taxonomy describing the possible types
of systematic choice-supportive misremembering that decision
making may induce. Then, we will review papers accounting
for the influence of potentially moderating factors on choice-
related misremembering after decision making (i.e., alignability
of attributes, delay before memory test, valence of stimuli,
individual differences, and type of memory test). After that,
following our taxonomy, we will appraise whether choice-
supportive misremembering is a robust and well-supported
phenomenon both within each category and overall. We
will also discuss the proposed explanations for choice-related
misremembering in terms of underlying cognitive and affective
processes.
From the theoretical viewpoint, the novel taxonomy and the
associated review offer a new unifying and clarifying perspective
on rather disconnected effects and phenomena, and the potential
reasons behind them. This will highlight the similarities and
differences between various kinds of misremembering after
choice, allow an appraisal of their respective degree of empirical
support, and provide more insight into the underlying processes.
Furthermore, it will shed light on underinvestigated aspects,
unresolved issues, and the more promising new research
directions. From the applied research viewpoint, gaining insight
into whether, when, and why decision-making processes distort
our memory could eventually help us determine to what extent
human memory can be trusted and give indications on how
to improve memory-based decision making. Indeed, a strongly
altered memory of past choices may affect future choices and
hinder proper learning from experience and adaptation to
reality.
A New Taxonomy of Misremembering
after Decision Making
Starting from a theoretical analysis and a review of the literature
connecting memory and decision making, we propose a new
taxonomy and analysis systematically addressing choice-
supportive misremembering after decision making (i.e.,
misremembering choice-related information in a way that boosts
the chosen option and/or demotes the foregone options). We
identified four conceptually distinct types of choice supportive
misremembering, with clear face validity, corresponding to
diverse research streams in the decision-making and memory
literatures: misattribution, fact distortion, false memory, and
selective forgetting (Figure 1).
Support for the proposed taxonomy comes from three
different sources: (1) the a-priori grounding of the taxonomy
categories in diverse and complementary theoretical views, (2)
the face validity of the different types of misremembering that
can be logically disentangled, (3) the empirical support coming
from the studies that will be reviewed in the present paper. We
introduce the taxonomy before presenting the review in order
to provide a clear organizing principle for the description of the
studies.
Misattribution is when positive attributes are remembered as
belonging to the chosen option when they in fact belonged to
the foregone option, or when negative attributes are remembered
as belonging to the foregone option when they in fact belonged
to the chosen option. For example, if the choice is between
two houses and the chosen house has a hole in the roof and
the foregone one has a wonderful view, the chosen house is
FIGURE 1 | The taxonomy of choice-supportive misremembering.
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remembered as having a wonderful view or the foregone one as
having a hole in the roof. Misattribution is a well-known type
of commission error, where a memory is misattributed to the
wrong source, and one of Schacter’s “seven sins of memory”
(Schacter, 1999). In line with research in the decision-making
field (Mather and Johnson, 2000; Mather et al., 2003), however,
our operational definition is narrower than Schacter’s, specifically
referring to the attribution of a correctly recalled feature to
the wrong option. Indeed, misattribution presupposes correct
encoding and recall of the actual information – only its source
is confused – while false memory represents a separate category
in our taxonomy, since it is a qualitatively different type of
error (remembering information never presented), which may
even be related to different underlying processes (e.g., Reyna
and Lloyd, 1997), an issue that will be discussed later in the
paper.
Fact distortion is when the objective values of features
belonging to the chosen option are misremembered as more
preferential than their actual values, and values of features
belonging to the foregone option as less preferential. An example
would be if in the choice between the two houses both were
located 1 km from the work place, but the chosen one is
remembered as being 500 m away and/or the foregone one as
being 1.5 km away. This actual distortion of facts is distinct from
changes in the subjective evaluation or attractiveness of options
during the decision-making process, which are widely studied
phenomena in the decision-making literature (e.g., Svenson
and Benthorn, 1992; Russo et al., 1996; Holyoak and Simon,
1999; Shamoun and Svenson, 2002). Altering specific pieces of
information is an error of commission possibly related to the
biasing influence of current beliefs on memory (Schacter, 1999).
Fact distortion in memory after choice has been specifically
postulated by the differentiation-consolidation theory (Svenson,
1992) and investigated by Svenson et al. (2009) and DeKay
et al. (2014) in studies that will be discussed later in this
review.
False memory in the context of choice-supportiveness is when
new attributes that were not part of the original options are
‘remembered’ as presented and, if their values are considered
positive, as belonging to the chosen option, and if negative,
as belonging to the foregone option. For example, the chosen
house might be remembered as being well insulated even
though no information about the insulation of either house had
been presented. False memories have been widely investigated
in the memory literature, for instance in relation to the
misinformation paradigm (e.g., Ayers and Reder, 1998; Laney
et al., 2008; Bernstein and Loftus, 2009; Cochran et al., 2016).
Some research has also been carried out on false memories
in relation to decision making (e.g., Pennington and Hastie,
1988; Sharman et al., 2008; Lindholm et al., 2014; Corbin
et al., 2015). They represent a more dramatic and radical
departure from reality than simple fact distortions, in that
an entire new piece of non-existing evidence is remembered.
Moreover, this type of error is not attributable to a properly
encoded but later confused feature, thus it is conceptually
distinct from misattributing a correctly recalled feature to
one of the presented options (for a classification of memory
errors and false memory phenomena see also Reyna and Lloyd,
1997).
Selective forgetting is when the positive attributes of the
chosen option and the negative attributes of the foregone option
are remembered at a higher rate than vice versa. An example
would be correctly remembering that the chosen house was
close to the work place, but forgetting its leaking roof. This
is a typical omission error, possibly fostered by the decreasing
accessibility of memory over time (“transience”: Schacter, 1999;
Schacter et al., 2003). Selective forgetting and remembering
has traditionally been studied in relation to the confirmation
bias (e.g., Levine and Murphy, 1943; Nickerson, 1998). Mather
et al. (2000) and Depping and Freund (2013) have investigated
the occurrence of this phenomenon after choice. Moreover,
selective forgetting has been studied more generally as the
outcome of incidental or motivated forgetting processes in the
memory literature (e.g., Bäuml, 2008; Anderson and Huddleston,
2012; Hirst and Echterhoff, 2012; Anderson and Hanslmayr,
2014).1
Eligibility Criteria for the Review
We included in the review only studies in which participants
were presented with at least two options with multiple features,
thus focusing on traditional multi-attribute choice problems,
which represent the typical scenarios investigated in decision-
making (e.g., Payne et al., 1993). Moreover, in the selected
studies, participants were asked to make a deliberate preferential
choice between the options after reviewing these features, which
qualifies only proper decision-making studies (e.g., Hastie and
Dawes, 2010). Based on evidence of important differences
between judgment and choice processes (see e.g., Payne et al.,
1993; Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006), any study where the
participants are asked to make a judgment rather than a choice
(e.g., Dellarosa and Bourne, 1984; Lindholm et al., 2014) or the
decision is based on a mere esthetic preference (e.g., Lieberman
et al., 2001; Johansson et al., 2005) was also excluded from this
review.
In addition to these structural selection criteria, which
adhere to traditional distinctions in judgment and decision-
making research, we adopted some additional criteria with the
specific aim to exert more control over the possibility that
the conclusions drawn from the literature review are actually
attributable to the influence of choice making on memory
processes and not affected by extraneous factors. In particular,
we excluded studies in which additional information (including
1The same misremembering classification can be applied in a straightforward way
to attribute values that are not just perceived as positive or negative, but simply
as better or worse along a common evaluation dimension. For instance, assuming
that a lower price is preferable to a higher price for a product, but that a decision
maker has chosen between two options the product with the higher price due to
its (other) better features, choice-supportive misattribution would imply switching
the association between options and prices when remembering them. Choice-
supportive fact distortion would imply remembering a price lower than the true
one for the chosen option and/or a higher one for the foregone option. If price had
not been presented at all, remembering that the chosen option had a lower price
than the alternative one would represent a case of choice-supportive false memory.
Finally, forgetting the price would represent an example of choice-supportive
selective forgetting.
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misinformation) was introduced between the choice and the
memory test. This left out from the review research on other
types of distortions, such as those resulting from well-known
hindsight paradigms. Indeed, in these conceptually different
types of situations, the memory distortion is at least partly
produced by the provision of information after the decision or
the experience and not by the decision per se (for reviews see e.g.,
Erdfelder et al., 2007; Louie et al., 2007; Bernstein et al., 2011;
Calvillo, 2012). Furthermore, in this review we are concerned
solely with preferential choice and not with the predictability
of an event or outcome, which is the main issue investigated in
studies on the hindsight bias (Roese and Vohs, 2012). We also
excluded studies in which participants themselves select which
information to access (as in, e.g., Redlawsk, 2001; Meffert et al.,
2006).
Finally, the memory test had to be of the information provided
and not of the influence of prior knowledge (see e.g., Dellarosa
and Bourne, 1984; Biehal and Chakravarti, 1986) or merely of
the choice made (e.g., Holyoak and Simon, 1999; Hall et al.,
2010), because these latter tests do not allow investigating choice-
supportive misremembering.
One study that appeared to qualify was excluded on the basis
of lack of details (Davidson and Kiesler, 1964), since our attempt
to obtain more information from the authors was unsuccessful.
Another study with partial information was included (Chen and
Zhang, 2003) but, due to the lack of detail, our review of that
study is limited.
Thorough searches using the key words “memor∗,” “recall∗,”
“recog∗,” “remem∗,” and “recoll∗” combined with “decision,”
“choice,” “option,” and “prefer∗” were conducted in the databases
ERIC, Psycarticles and PsycINFO, as well as in Google Scholar.
Additionally, after assessing the eligibility of the articles or
proceedings found, all backward and forward references of
the eligible papers were assessed using both Web of Science
and Scopus. The time period covered by the search was until
July 2017. Postings were made to relevant decision-making
mailing lists (Society of Judgment and Decision Making, and
European Association for Judgment and Decision Making)
asking for both published and unpublished papers on memory
biases or distortions or misremembering after choice. Table 1
summarizes the main features of the studies satisfying our
inclusion criteria.
Influence of Choice on
Choice-Supportive Misremembering
Before discussing research on choice-supportive
misremembering, it is necessary to appraise whether a necessary
condition for the existence of this phenomenon holds: the very
act of making a choice should influence subsequent memory
of the options. Thus, it is essential to assess whether the effects
are only observed after choice or whether they are also found
when no active choice has been made. For this reason, several
of the experiments use a design with a control group whose
participants do not make a choice but are simply assigned an
option (Mather et al., 2003; Benney and Henkel, 2006; Hess and
Kotter-Grühn, 2011). In other studies participants are provided
a “best interest” option (Benney and Henkel, 2006), or asked to
focus on “readability” of a text rather than its contents (Depping
and Freund, 2013).
All of these studies, apart from the latter, found that
making a choice induces choice-supportive misremembering.
Such misremembering was found for assigned options only when
the participants had been led to believe that the assignment
was based on their best interest (Benney and Henkel, 2006).
When participants had not been told that the assignment was
in their best interest, participants’ memory slightly favored the
option they had not been assigned. In particular, Benney and
Henkel did not observe choice-supportive misremembering in
the assignment group and they observed the effect both in the
free choice group and the best interest group, with these two latter
groups not differing significantly.
Likewise, Mather et al. (2003) found choice-supportiveness
in their choice group, but not in the assignment group. Hess
and Kotter-Grühn (2011) also found significantly higher level
of choice-supportiveness of memory in the social interaction
(choice) condition than in the impression (no choice) condition,
but as the participants in the impression group were not
told which option they had been assigned, the design did not
enable an analysis of the effect on memory of being assigned
an option. It is also worth noting that Mather et al. (2000)
observed similar choice-supportiveness when participants had
to choose one option vs. when they had to reject one option.
Interestingly, Henkel and Mather (2007) observed misattribution
to be supportive of the choice they thought they had made rather
than of their actual choice. As pointed out by the authors, this
indicates that belief at the time of retrieval can influence memory
accuracy and thus that the observed misremembering cannot be
entirely due to encoding processes. Only Depping and Freund
(2013) did not find choice-supportive memory in the groups
making a choice.
FACTORS POTENTIALLY INFLUENCING
MEMORY CHOICE-SUPPORTIVENESS
Before reviewing the studies within each category of choice-
supporting memory, we will discuss some factors potentially
moderating misremembering, given that these factors may
be influential across the four proposed categories. The main
potential moderating factors are alignability of the attribute
values, delay between presentation of the options and memory
test, valence (of the scenarios, options and attributes), individual
differences, and type of memory test. These factors have been
found to affect decision making or memory significantly (e.g.,
Payne et al., 1993; Markman and Medin, 1995; Schacter and
Coyle, 1997; Schacter, 1999) and thus they may play also a role
in choice-supportive misremembering.
Alignability
A factor that may influence misremembering after choice is
alignability (i.e., whether both options have directly comparable
features). For example, when choosing between houses, an
attribute value belonging to one option may be that it is 1 km
from the city center and one belonging to the other option that
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it is located 2 km from the city center. These attribute values are
alignable (or commensurable), whereas those features that do not
have a comparable one in the other option are not.
The effects of alignability on decision making or memory
have been investigated in a number of studies (e.g., Markman
and Medin, 1995; Markman and Gentner, 1997; Mather et al.,
2005), and the degree of alignability varies across the studies we
reviewed. All attributes of the options in Svenson et al. (2009),
Queen and Hess (2010) and DeKay et al. (2014) were alignable,
whereas others employed a design where half of the attributes
were alignable and the other half unalignable (Budson et al., 2006;
Hess et al., 2012). The remaining studies did not specifically assess
the importance of alignability and did not specify the alignability
of the attributes. From the evidence available, it appears that none
of the remaining papers used scenario features that were entirely
or substantially alignable.
Choice-supportive memory has been observed both in
studies with alignable attributes and in studies with non-
alignable attributes (see Table 1). However, Hess et al. (2012)
observed an interaction between age and alignability, with choice
supportiveness scores increasing from the young to middle-aged
to older groups for alignable attributes but not for unalignable
attributes. This effect was no longer significant when a composite
ability measure was used as a covariate. Generally, they
observed greater choice-supportiveness for alignable attributes.
This suggests that the effect can be greater for alignable features,
at least in some populations (see also Mather et al., 2005; Budson
et al., 2006), and that this difference can be related to cognitive
skills. However, more studies are needed to fully clarify the role
of alignability in choice-supportive misremembering, especially
in relation to the category of false memories and in different
populations.
Delay
An important factor affecting memory is the extent of the
delay between encoding (i.e., viewing the information about the
options) and retrieval (i.e., the memory test). An increased delay
is likely to result in more misremembering, but it is possible that
delay affects different types of memory distortions differently.
Unfortunately, although some memory studies have found false
memories to increase over time (e.g., Sulin and Dooling, 1974;
Howe et al., 2010), the relative influence of delay, memory
test, and material used on choice-supportive misremembering
has not been properly scrutinized. Indeed, none of the studies
reviewed allow us to draw strong conclusions about this, as
they did not systematically investigate types of misremembering
vs. delay. However, some used a design with different delay
levels in the same study (Mather and Johnson, 2000; Chen and
Zhang, 2003), showing how delay affected the particular type of
memory distortion studied. The other experiments all used rather
short but variable time lags (Budson et al., 2006; DeKay et al.,
2014).
Chen and Zhang (2003) found that when using a “long”
delay, positive attributes were more likely to be attributed to
the chosen option in their high-conflict condition than in their
low conflict condition (similar vs. diverse attractiveness of the
choice options). Unfortunately, that paper does not specify
exactly the length of the delays used, and we have not been
able to obtain more information about the experiment from the
authors. Mather and Johnson (2000) found that, although most
participants exhibited a source attribution bias favoring their
chosen option, there was no significant effect of delay (30 min
vs. 2 days) other than the group with older participants and
the longest delay (2 days) showing the weakest memory for
every measure. It is clear that studies further investigating the
effect of delay on choice-supportive misremembering are needed.
Not only would it be interesting to see whether delays longer
than 2 days (the longest delay after which choice-supportiveness
was assessed) produce more choice-supportive misremembering
compared with shorter delays, but also whether delay specifically
affects the different types of distortions observed.
Sequential vs. Simultaneous
Presentation of Information
Choice-supportive memory phenomena can be the product of
biased encoding or biased recall of the information presented
(or both). In the former case, the decision maker may have
encoded altered or partial information before making a choice
(predecisional distortion: DeKay, 2015). In the latter case, choice-
supportive memory originates from processes occurring after a
decision has been made. Sequential presentation of information
(vs. simultaneous presentation) might favor predecisional
distortion (DeKay et al., 2014).
The studies we reviewed vary in relation to the information
presentation type. Some of them used a sequential presentation of
the options or attributes (Queen and Hess, 2010; Hess and Kotter-
Grühn, 2011; Hess et al., 2012; DeKay et al., 2014), whereas
the participants in the remaining studies made their choice
with the information simultaneously and externally available.
Choice-supportive misremembering has been observed both with
sequential and with simultaneous presentation of information.
However, given that no study appraised systematically the
influence of information presentation on choice-supportive
memory, more research is needed.
Valence
The impact of valence in relation to misremembering after
choice can be evaluated at three levels: scenario, option, and
attribute. Making a choice in a positive scenario or situation
(e.g., going on holiday and choosing between two different
destinations) may not result in the same degree and kind of
misremembering as a choice in a negative scenario or situation
(e.g., being seriously ill and choosing between two different
methods of surgery). Similarly, a desirable and an undesirable
option, or positive and negative attributes, may be distorted to
different degrees. Out of the studies reviewed, only Depping
and Freund (2013) attempted to clarify whether the valence
of the scenarios/situation influence memory distortion. They
conducted two experiments with older and younger participants
to investigate the impact of valence and choice on memory.
Unfortunately, Depping and Freund failed to observe significant
choice-supportive misremembering in their studies, regardless
of the age group investigated, and therefore no interaction
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with valence was detectable. However, the other studies we
reviewed found significant choice-supportive memory using
positively, neutrally and negatively valenced settings, although
only Svenson et al. (2009) used a clearly negative scenario. This
implies that valence may not be critical for observing choice-
supportive memory effects, although more studies systematically
investigating its influence on choice-supportive misremembering
are needed.
Individual Differences
Not everyone may misremember to the same degree. Age as
well as individual differences in terms of cognitive abilities and
personality are likely to be influential. Thus, several of the studies
included different age groups (Mather and Johnson, 2000; Mather
et al., 2005; Queen and Hess, 2010; Hess and Kotter-Grühn, 2011;
Hess et al., 2012; Depping and Freund, 2013), and some also
individual differences in cognitive ability (Mather and Johnson,
2000; Queen and Hess, 2010; Hess and Kotter-Grühn, 2011; Hess
et al., 2012).
As far as overall choice-supportiveness is concerned, only
Mather and Johnson (2000) found that older age is associated
with greater choice-supportive misremembering (in particular,
source misattribution). Indeed, Queen and Hess (2010), Hess
and Kotter-Grühn (2011), Hess et al. (2012), and Depping and
Freund (2013) all observed that the memory of older adults was
not significantly more choice-supportive than that of younger
adults. Although age has mainly been looked at in relation to
valence or overall choice-supportiveness, Hess and Kotter-Grühn
(2011) introduced another dimension: morality vs. competence
judgments. The participants in their first experiment were older
and younger adults, rating target persons based on statements
focusing on either morality or competence. The participants in
one subgroup made an impression of the target persons and those
in the other chose whom to spend a day with socially. Only in
the older adult group was choice-supportiveness specific to the
morality domain. Curiously, although different adult age groups
have been investigated in several studies, research in children is
lacking and it would represent an interesting avenue for future
investigations.
The participants in three of the reviewed studies (Mather and
Johnson, 2000; Hess and Kotter-Grühn, 2011; Hess et al., 2012)
completed cognitive tests as part of the experiments. However,
only Mather and Johnson (2000) discussed the correlations
between the scores obtained there in older participants and
the observed choice-supportiveness in memory. They assessed
cognitive capacity with nine neuropsychological tests, and found
significant correlations between memory choice-supportiveness
and scores on tests requiring the kind of executive and reflective
processing associated with the frontal lobes of the brain, but
no significant correlations with tests of memory functions
associated with the medial-temporal regions (only in their control
condition). They also did not find correlations between overall
memory accuracy and choice-supportive memory. In particular,
participants with better performance in tests of frontal/executive
functioning were less prone to choice-supportive memory.
Mather and Johnson (2000) set out to explore the influence
of emotional/motivational factors on memory after decision
making by comparing groups of participants assigned to three
different review conditions: affective (think about how you felt
about the options), factual (review the details of the options)
and no review (filler task). The emotional focus in the affective
condition increased the rate of choice-supportive memory in
younger adults. This was the case despite the fact that the actual
choice features were remembered equally well in the different
review conditions. Interestingly, general memory capacity and
even recognition accuracy in the specific scenario did not predict
the level of choice-supportive misattribution.
Memory Test
Given that “whether a person remembers an event depends on
how memory is assessed” (Roediger and Gallo, 2001, p. 19), the
method of testing memory is likely to have an impact on memory
distortion. In the majority of the reviewed studies, memory of
the options was tested through recognition. For instance, after
choosing between two houses to purchase (“Red brick house”
vs. “White house built of wood”), participants were asked to
say whether “Safe neighborhood” was a feature belonging to the
former or to the latter option or if was a new feature (never
presented) (Mather and Johnson, 2000). Chen and Zhang (2003)
and Mather et al. (2005), however, also included free recall (e.g.,
asking participants to recall all the attributes they could from each
of the choice options). Unfortunately, Chen and Zhang (2003)
did not mention whether any differences were found between
the two assessment methods, and we have not been successful in
obtaining more information about their experiment and findings.
Mather et al. (2005) did not assess choice-supportive memory
in their two free recall experiments. Depping and Freund (2013)
used free recall and Svenson et al. (2009) cued recall. No choice
supportiveness was observed in the former study, while choice-
supportive fact distortion was observed in the latter one.
To sum up, we cannot draw any strong conclusions about
the influence of the type of memory test, as none of the
papers specifically addressed this question. In particular, although
choice-supportive memory has been observed repeatedly with
recognition paradigms, it is not known whether the effect
is reliable with free recall due to the scarcity of studies. In
future research, it would be interesting to decipher whether
recognition, cued and free recall yield differences in choice-
supportive misremembering, also considering that free recall and
cued recall are the more likely situations to occur in real life when
someone is trying to remember the features of the options of a
past choice in view of a related one.
A more specific issue related to the memory test concerns
the fact that recognition tests for source attribution generally
include both new and old features, where the old features are
those that had been attributed to one option in the initial
presentation and the new ones are the foils for the test. According
to some scholars, assessing the extent to which old and new
features are misattributed is not only useful to unveil choice-
supportive misremembering, but it can also give some partial
insight into when in the memory process the distortion is likely
to have occurred. Benney and Henkel (2006), for example, found
more choice-supportive memory for old than for new features.
Both correctly and incorrectly, participants were more likely to
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attribute positive old features to the chosen option, but this was
not the case for new features. Conversely, Henkel and Mather
(2007) found similar choice-supportive misattribution for old
and new features. As they pointed out, although it may be the
case that participants are more attentive to the positive features
that subsequently make them choose one option over the other,
the fact that choice-supportive distortion was observed also
for new features indicates that biased encoding alone may not
explain the observed systematic memory distortion. Mather et al.
(2003) found that positive old features were both correctly and
incorrectly more likely to be attributed to the chosen option.
Negative old features, on the other hand, were more likely to
be attributed to the foregone option, although this effect was
significantly smaller. Finally, positive new features were even
more likely to be attributed to the chosen option than any of
the old attributes, and negative new features were the ones most
likely to be attributed to the foregone option. Similarly, Mather
et al. (2000) found choice-supportive memory for old and new
features, although it did not reach significance for new features in
half of their scenarios. Again, the largest choice-supportiveness
effect was found from positive features attributed to the chosen
option rather than negative features attributed to the foregone
option.
Other Factors
Other factors could also affect misremembering after choice.
For example, Queen and Hess (2010) and Hess et al. (2012)
investigated the impact of deliberation (as opposed to intuition)
during decision making on choice and on subsequent memory.
Whereas Queen and Hess (2010) found no effect, Hess et al.
(2012) observed more choice-supportive memory with no
deliberation than with active deliberation, which was in line with
their hypothesis that more attentive processing would decrease
choice-supportive misremembering.
Svenson et al. (2009) found that memory distortion effects
were stronger on conflicting attributes than on the attribute
that turned out to be the most decisive. One of the hypotheses
supported in their experiments was that there would be no
consolidation of the attribute that each participant considered
to be the most important. This provides some support for the
notion that a higher degree of conflict on less important attributes
would increase the memory distortion of the attributes. Chen
and Zhang (2003), who focused on the differences in memory
distortion between high and low conflict options, also found
more choice-supportive memory where the options were more
balanced in terms of attractiveness (high conflict) when testing
the participants after a “long” delay (the precise length of which
is unspecified).
Another factor that was looked at in one of the studies
reviewed was how beliefs of what choice one has made affects
subsequent memory (Henkel and Mather, 2007). Here, it was
found that memory was biased in favor of the options the
participants thought they had selected rather than their actual
choices. The only difference compared to correctly remembered
choices was that only somewhat, but not significantly, more
negative items were attributed to the option they believe they had
rejected. Not surprisingly, source accuracy was superior when
the choice was correctly remembered. Similarly, Mather and
Johnson (2000) discovered that, with increased delay, the believed
choice became more likely to impact memory attributions than
the actual choice. As the authors point out, this indicates that
beliefs held at the time of retrieval is sufficient to create memory
distortion, thus pointing to a crucial influence of the retrieval/test
stage in the generation of choice-supportiveness.
CHOICE-SUPPORTIVE
MISREMEMBERING
Misattribution
The first type of memory distortion after decision making,
misattribution, can be described as a type of choice-
supportive misremembering where experimenters observe
that participants misattribute attribute values to the wrong
option when their memory is being tested after a delay. As
mentioned previously, this is a narrower and thus more
precise definition than previous ones (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993;
Schacter and Coyle, 1997). Misattribution is the most widely
studied phenomenon in relation to memory distortion after
choice. Much of the body of research on choice-blindness also
investigates a kind of misattribution phenomenon of identifying
a foregone option as the chosen one after a short delay (e.g.,
Pärnamets et al., 2015; Somerville and McGowan, 2016) as do
other studies on the effect of bias on memory (Frost et al., 2015).
Several studies found choice-supportive misattribution
(Mather and Johnson, 2000; Mather et al., 2000, 2003; Chen and
Zhang, 2003; Benney and Henkel, 2006; Henkel and Mather,
2007; Queen and Hess, 2010; Hess and Kotter-Grühn, 2011;
Hess et al., 2012), and none of the studies in this category that
investigated choice-supportiveness failed to find this effect. From
the reviewed studies, as we have already seen in the Memory
Test section, it can also be concluded that the choice-supportive
memory is more due to attributing positive features to the chosen
option than to attributing negative items to the foregone option,
although both of these phenomena are common.
Several processes may underlie misattribution. Biased
encoding, errors in source attribution, and reconstructive
remembering at the time of retrieval are the main ones
proposed. As noted by Mather et al. (2003), attentional focus at
encoding may provide a partial explanation, but their finding
that new items are attributed in a choice-supportive manner
points to the importance of the retrieval stage, as that is when
source attribution takes place. When the source is not clearly
remembered, the knowledge (or belief) of what choice one made
may be used as an aid to infer the most likely source (Mather
and Johnson, 2000). Indeed, Henkel and Mather (2007) found
that the belief – at the time of retrieval – that one had made
a particular choice, was sufficient to yield choice-supportive
memory even when that belief was in fact incorrect.
Explanations focused on emotional and motivational factors
point to the influence of emotional goals: the desire to feel
that one has made the right choice and that the chosen
option is superior to the foregone one may reduce regret and
promote well-being (e.g., Taylor and Brown, 1988; Kunda, 1990).
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Mather et al. (2003) suggested that the belief and desire to
have made the right decision provide a likely explanation for
choice-supportiveness. Cognitive factors offer an alternative or
complementary explanation. As the processing of stereotype
inconsistent information has been found to be more cognitively
demanding than that of stereotype consistent data (e.g., McIntyre
and Craik, 1987; Henkel et al., 1998), it may follow that any
information inconsistent with the final choice may require more
elaboration and cognitive effort. If such processing is rendered
more difficult by age or cognitive capacity, there may be an
increased reliance on feelings.
Fact Distortion
As pointed out by Svenson et al. (2009), most research on
memory distortion after decision making has focused on the
subjective evaluation of the relevant facts rather than the
recollection of the quantitative facts themselves. The focus of
the three experiments covered in their paper and in three of the
experiments in DeKay et al. (2014) was therefore the memory of
the facts provided to the participants when asking them to make
a choice between two options.
Similar to the studies in the misattribution category,
both Svenson et al. (2009) and DeKay et al. (2014) found
systematic misremembering favoring the chosen option and
downgrading the foregone option. However, DeKay et al. (2014)
looked at memory misremembering resulting from predecisional
distortion of options based on whether they were leading or
trailing alternatives early on in the decision process, whereas
Svenson et al. (2009) were interested in the effect of choice on
memory. Interestingly, all the experiments in the DeKay et al.
(2014) paper and two out of three of those in the Svenson
et al. (2009) paper found that most of this distortion stemmed
from upgrading the leader or chosen alternative, and only one
(Study 3, Svenson et al., 2009) that downgrading the foregone
alternative contributed to most of the distortion. In Experiment
4 of the DeKay et al. (2014) paper, downgrading the trailer
did not even reach significance. The general trend in these six
experiments is thus that bolstering the favored option is the main
contributor to this kind of memory distortion. However, the
proposed mechanisms behind these effects can be considerably
different and point to the importance of methodology when
trying to discern underlying factors.
DeKay et al. (2014) found that participants’ predecisional
distortion of attributes correlated with their postdecision
memory of them and cannot be attributed to response bias or any
processes occurring after the choice. The suggested explanation is
instead that new information is subjectively encoded as superior
relative to its true value if it belongs to the currently leading
option, and as inferior relative to its true value if it belongs
to the trailer. This bias during encoding then would cause the
memory distortion observed during the recall of facts. The
authors also concluded that the errors appear to stem from
biases in the mental representation of the facts rather than from
the judged importance of the information. DeKay et al. (2014)
argued, following the outcome of specific control analyses in
their studies, that response biases and inferences made from one’s
choice are unlikely to explain choice-supportive memories of
their participants. Thus, the authors allege that it is the initial
mental representation of the information rather than any later
processes that gives rise to the distortions in memory.
Svenson et al. (2009) on the other hand, argued that the
systematic self-serving fact distortion that they observe in their
three experiments is more likely to have arisen in the postdecision
stage, as the decisions were made with the information externally
available. Thus, at the moment the decision was made, the facts
could not be misperceived. The observed memory distortions
were predicted by the differentiation-consolidation theory (e.g.,
Svenson, 1992), according to which decision making is a process
of differentiation between the alternatives before deciding and
then of consolidation of the decision once made. Thus, the
delay between the decision and the recall of that decision would
allow the strengthening (consolidation) of the decision and
the decision maker’s confidence in it by means of increased
choice-supportive memory. According to the differentiation-
consolidation theory, fact distortion may occur either before or
after a decision has been made and thus potentially both during
encoding and during consolidation and it can be related both
to cognitive factors (schema/gestalt-related processing) and to
emotion-related factors (regret avoidance).
More studies investigating fact distortion and the time course
of the observed effects in different scenarios and using a variety
of methods will be useful to better understand when choice-
supportive fact distortion takes place in different circumstances.
It is also important to point out that fact distortion can be
investigated only with free recall (and cued recall) and not with
recognition, which represents the test that has been used in the
great majority of studies on choice-supportive misremembering.
False Memory
The third type of self-serving memory distortion proposed
in our taxonomy is false memory; when attributes or facts
not previously presented are ‘remembered.’ Most often, false
memories have been studied as a consequence of misinformation
from the experimenter (e.g., Ayers and Reder, 1998; Bernstein
et al., 2005). The wider concept of false memory, however, has
also been observed in studies where participants are asked to
make a judgment after attentive consideration of evidence (e.g.,
Lindholm et al., 2014).
Studies offering evidence for choice-supportive false
memories are reported by some of the papers fulfilling the
inclusion criteria for this review and using source recognition
when testing the memory of the options (e.g., Mather and
Johnson, 2000; Mather et al., 2003; Henkel and Mather, 2007).
In those studies, the fact that some new features presented in
the recognition test were recognized as old can be interpreted as
indirect evidence of false memory, although other explanations
are possible (e.g., the use of a more inference-based decision
strategy for the ‘new’ items, perceived as less accessible).
None of the reviewed studies assessed false memory using
free or cued recall. In particular, free recall tests will be highly
informative in that they may provide less ambiguous and indirect
information on the occurrence of a false memory than the
just-mentioned source recognition studies. In future research,
it would be useful to investigate the conditions needed for
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false memories to arise even without misinformation and when
memory is assessed using free or cued recall (e.g., long delay).
Moreover, considering that the memory literature has highlighted
sizable individual differences in proneness to false memories (e.g.,
Winograd et al., 1998; Zhu et al., 2010), it would be interesting to
consider the role of individual differences in choice-supportive
false memories.
The papers reviewed do not discuss the specific mechanisms
behind false memories directly, as none of them focused
exclusively on this type of misremembering. Constructive or
schema-based explanations (Loftus, 1995), fuzzy trace theory
(Reyna and Brainerd, 1995), and the source monitoring
framework (Johnson et al., 1993) are three of the main theories
attempting to explain the mechanisms behind false memory and
they can be applied also in the context of choice-supportive false
memories. Constructive or schema-based explanations assume
that false memories originate from semantic integration and
inferences that can change memory traces or simply produce
competing and thus interfering traces (Loftus et al., 1978). Fuzzy
trace theory stresses the distinction between verbatim and gist
memory traces, where verbatim traces focus on precise details
and gist traces on core meaning. These two types of traces
arise in parallel, but verbatim traces are more susceptible to
interference and the negative effects of increased delay rather
than gist traces. Thus, false memories may arise when the gist
affects remembering of verbatim information, or when verbatim
memories from different sources are confused with one another.
The source monitoring framework, on the other hand, stipulates
that false memories are caused by thoughts, images and feelings
from one source being mistakenly attributed to another source.
In the context of our taxonomy false memories may consist
in the production of an entirely new attribute with its values.
This kind of phenomenon is more difficult to explain by
making reference to wrong source attribution and easier to
explain referring to constructive semantic processes or gist-
based influences, assuming that the new attribute and their
values are semantically consistent with the choice context and
the overall attractiveness of choice options. However, choice-
supportive false memories may be alternatively considered as
failures of reality monitoring (i.e., the inability to discriminate
between internal and external sources of information), although
it would remain unexplained how these memories are initially
formed. We will come back later to the theories of false memory
in the general discussion on the explanations of the various types
of misremembering in our taxonomy.
An understanding of the false memory phenomenon is
important in the context of choice-supportive memory not only
because it is one main type of misremembering, but also because
the false memory literature shows that both actual events and
falsely remembered events can affect our future attitudes and
possibly our future decisions. For example, implanting false
memories about loving asparagus the first time they were tried
led participants to appreciate the food more and be willing
to pay a higher sum for it (Laney et al., 2008), whereas false
memories about becoming ill after eating a particular food
(Bernstein and Loftus, 2009) or drinking a particular alcoholic
beverage (Clifasefi et al., 2013) diminished their liking of it,
although consolidated food-related behavior seems difficult to
change (Bernstein and Loftus, 2009). In line with these findings,
Henkel and Mather (2007) found that memory was affected by
the choice the participants thought they had made rather than
the one they had actually made.
Selective Forgetting
The final type of misremembering in our taxonomy is what
we have labeled ‘selective forgetting’: when the negative features
of the chosen option or the positive features of the foregone
option are selectively forgotten. Mather et al. (2000) observed
not only choice-supportive misattribution, but also choice-
supportive recognition. That is, participants were more likely to
recognize positive features of the selected option than positive
features of the foregone option, thus showing selective forgetting
of the latter ones. Choice-supportive recognition, however, was
observed only for positive and not for negative features and
not in all the scenarios tested. Thus, in some scenarios, “which
option participants selected affected which positive items but not
which negative items they recognized as old” (Mather et al., 2000,
p. 136).
Depping and Freund (2013) primarily investigated selective
forgetting (rather than misattribution or fact distortion). The
main conclusion of their studies was that processing of decision-
relevant information promotes a stronger focus on negative
information in older adults and older adults remember more
negative information in choice contexts. However, in their
studies, Depping and Freund did not observe significant choice-
supportive selective forgetting.
Other studies, not reviewed here because not specifically
concerned with choice-supportive memory, suggest that making
a choice may produce selective forgetting (or remembering). For
instance, Biehal and Chakravarti (1982) contrasted memory for
options after choice vs. directed learning of the same information.
They observed that memory for chosen options had a similar
level of accuracy as memory under directed learning, while
accuracy of memory for rejected brands was poorer. The possible
implication is that decision makers focus more on the chosen
option and on the more choice-relevant information and this
may have consequences for subsequent memory, both in terms of
better remembering of the chosen option and, possibly, in terms
of choice-supportive remembering. However, although there is
some evidence that choice-supportive selective forgetting may
take place, as we have seen, the evidence is very limited and more
studies are needed.
For what concerns potential explanations, existing research,
together with research in related topics like confirmation bias
(Nickerson, 1998) and incidental and motivated forgetting
(Bäuml, 2008; Anderson and Huddleston, 2012; Anderson and
Hanslmayr, 2014), suggest that both biased encoding and biased
retrieval processes may contribute to the phenomenon, possibly
together with suppression of information not supportive of the
chosen option and retrieval-based strengthening of supportive
information. Interestingly, related research seems to suggest a
more important role for encoding-related processes in this kind
of distortion as compared, for instance, to more retrieval-based
phenomena (like false memories). However, direct research on
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the processes underlying choice-supportive selective forgetting is
lacking and new studies on this topic are needed.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
Summary of the Findings
In this review, we have presented a novel taxonomy of choice-
supportive misremembering after decision making and reviewed
papers where the participants make a deliberate choice between
options described by multiple attributes and their memory
of those attributes is then tested. Our taxonomy represents
a theoretically and empirically derived classification of the
main types of misremembering after choice: misattribution, fact
distortion, false memory, and selective forgetting.
Misattribution is by far the most frequently investigated
phenomenon and there is good evidence for it when source
recognition tests are used. Indeed, the reviewed evidence seems
robust and manifests itself primarily as biased attribution of
positive features to the chosen option rather than negative items
to the foregone option. Conversely, fact distortion has rarely been
investigated, and merits further research, and so does selective
forgetting (for which only weak evidence exists). Although some
studies provided some evidence compatible with the existence of
these two latter types of distortions, there is clearly not sufficient
research to date to draw solid conclusions as to the extent of
choice-supportive memory in these categories. Therefore, further
studies are needed to clarify whether these phenomena are
robust, especially when memory is assessed through free or cued
recall. The evidence for choice-supportive false memories after
decision making is also meager and obtained mainly with a
recognition paradigm, which may complicate the interpretation
of the findings due to potential alternative explanations.
Proposed Explanations
Most of the papers where choice-supportive memory was
observed do not delve deeply into the proposed mechanisms
and explanations behind the phenomenon, but several
theories can account for the various types of decision-related
misremembering observed. The proposed explanations of the
effects can be broadly classified in ‘cognitive’ vs. ‘affective,’ with
some accounts making reference to both aspects. At the moment,
the relative roles of cognition and emotion are not entirely clear.
Neither have the specific processes behind choice-supportive
misremembering been fully ascertained, even if some studies
have provided preliminary evidence.
From a cognitive perspective, Festinger’s cognitive dissonance
theory (Festinger, 1957) generally predicts that healthy adults
seek to avoid holding conflicting beliefs or values, and thus
tend to distort them in a manner that reduces that dissonance.
This would imply that after making a choice one’s memory
of the options would be distorted in a manner that would
diminish any conflict and the choice would be remembered as
more consistent (e.g., Brehm, 1956). The process of reducing
conflict could be instrumental in reaching a decision, and
continue once it has been made. The result would be choice-
supportive memory. A cognitive account of choice-supportive
misremembering can also be provided by the fuzzy trace
theory (Reyna and Brainerd, 1995), suggesting that memory
processes can produce verbatim or gist representations, with
the former focusing on specific details and the latter on the
core meaning of experiences. When a choice has to be made,
gist is more important and better remembered than the precise
details and the individual may therefore remember mainly
that one alternative was superior enough to be chosen, and
this general idea of superiority may then bias memory toward
choice-supportiveness. Likewise, schema-driven or constructive
processing (e.g., Sulin and Dooling, 1974; Loftus, 1995; see also
Dooling and Christiaansen, 1977) would imply that memory
would be distorted in agreement with the mental representation
of the choice made (i.e., the chosen option is better than the
alternative one and thus it was selected). Finally, the source
monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993; Mitchell and
Johnson, 2000, 2009; Johnson, 2006) would explain choice-
supportive misremembering either in terms of confusion between
different sources (options) for a retrieved item or in terms of a
failure of discrimination between internal and external sources of
information (depending on the type of misremembering).
Among these theories, source monitoring seems to be
naturally and directly applicable to the misattribution category
in our taxonomy (as a case of source attribution error), but it
is less directly applicable to selective forgetting, false memory,
and fact distortion. This does not mean that the theory cannot
explain these effects, because they could be considered as the
result of confusion between internal and external sources of
information, but their explanation would require additional
assumptions and specification. In particular, source monitoring
needs additional major assumptions to cover selective forgetting.
Moreover, the theory should also be able to explain how false
memories are generated before being confused with the reality
and how attribute values are distorted before being associated
with real options, and why wrong attributions tend to boost
the chosen option and demote the foregone one (e.g., perhaps
due to the knowledge of one owns choice or related beliefs).
Furthermore, bringing knowledge- or belief-related assumptions
into the theory would blur the distinction between the source
monitoring framework and the constructive/schema-related
theories. These latter theories, as well as fuzzy-trace theory,
have complementary strengths/weaknesses: they seem more able
to explain choice-supportive false memory, fact distortion, and
selective forgetting, due to postulated semantic/knowledge or
gist-based influences on encoding and/or retrieval processes,
and perhaps less directly able to explain choice-supportive
misattribution. Neither can it be excluded that different
mechanisms may explain different kinds of misremembering in
out taxonomy. Additionally, it is also important to remember that
other specific processes may even be involved in specific cases,
like inhibition of non-supportive information or retrieval-based
strengthening of supportive information in the case of selective
forgetting/remembering (e.g., Bäuml, 2008).
From an affective perspective, memory may be choice-
supportive as an implicit means to enhance positivity about
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oneself and one’s decision making via emotion regulation
(Mather and Carstensen, 2005). Indeed, socioemotional
selectivity theory underlines the individual’s adaptations to
her or his life course, with the reduction in time horizons
strengthening the motivation to preserve emotional balance
(vs. knowledge-related goals), and leading to a greater focus on
emotion regulation and positive aspects of life (e.g., Carstensen,
2006). These changes are thought to affect attention and memory
processes in a way that promotes the maintenance of a positive
emotional state also via choice-supportive misremembering.
This would be in line with the notion of self-protecting memory
in the field of autobiographical memories: the motivationally
driven pursuit of a positive self-definition taking precedence
over accuracy and truthfulness (see e.g., Sedikides et al., 2004;
see also Campbell and Sedikides, 1999; Sedikides and Green,
2000; Tesser, 2001). An explanation referring both to cognitive
and to emotional factors is provided by the differentiation-
consolidation theory (Svenson, 2003). The theory holds that,
once the differentiation process needed to reach a decision has
been completed, “postdecision processes (called consolidation)
work in support of the chosen alternative to maintain this
alternative as the preferred gestalt separated from the non-
chosen alternative, but also to protect the decision against
poor outcomes, regrets, and so on” (p. 291). This suggests the
intriguing possibility that multiple and diverse determinants
underlie choice-supportive misremembering.
One of the major questions still open is therefore whether a
higher degree of choice-supportive memory is better explained
by higher degree of emotion regulation or whether it instead
reflects more reliance on schema-driven, gist-based processing,
or on error-prone source monitoring. Some of the evidence for
the affective explanation of choice-supportive memory comes
from studies comparing older and younger adults, starting
from the assumption that older adults, due to their greater
effort in maintaining a positive emotional balance due to age-
related changes in high level goals (Mather and Carstensen,
2005; Carstensen, 2006), would show a greater degree of choice-
supportive memory distortion than younger adults. Indeed,
although a difference was found in one study (e.g., Mather
and Johnson, 2000), as we have seen, the evidence is generally
negative. In the study of Mather and Johnson (2000), the results of
the ‘affective review’ condition in younger adults also point to the
role of socio-emotional factors.2 However, the negative relation
between control measures and choice-supportive distortion in
older participants is not in agreement with the general statement
that control abilities are needed to ensure emotion-regulation
success (Mather and Carstensen, 2005; Mather and Knight, 2005),
suggesting to the need for clarification of the role of cognitive
control in different kinds of positivity biases. A possibility is
that less effective active encoding and recollection processes,
together with emotion-related factors, might contribute to older
adults’ stronger positivity bias for past choices (Mather and
Johnson, 2000) – assuming that this age-related exacerbation
of the bias exists – with the decline of executive control
2Rather surprisingly, Mather and Johnson (2000) failed to observe such distortion
in the control condition in younger adults.
processes playing a significant role (Del Missier et al., 2012,
2015).
Another issue that would deserve more investigation is
to elucidate more precisely the possible interplay between
emotional and cognitive factors in determining choice-
supportive misremembering and to provide more direct
evidence for the proposed relations. While some approaches,
like the socio-emotional one, seem to imply that affective
and motivational drivers affect memory of choice options via
cognitive mechanisms like those underlying biased source
attribution (Mather and Johnson, 2000; Mather and Carstensen,
2005; Mather and Knight, 2005), there is no sufficient evidence,
at the moment, to support empirically a more distal role of
affect and a more proximal one of cognition. It may well be
that cognition contributes to choice-supportive monitoring
beyond emotion, as cognitive theories of false memory seem to
suggest. And, as we have just discussed, more studies are also
needed to better appraise the specific cognitive and emotional
mechanisms involved and the time course of their potential
interaction. Clearly, given the mixed results of the studies,
research investigating more directly the paramount issue of the
processes underlying the choice-supportive misremembering
is needed, both to shed light on the respective contribution of
cognitive and emotional factors and to clarify what kinds of
cognitive (e.g., cognitive control, attention, episodic encoding
and/or retrieval) and emotional processes (e.g., implicit or
explicit emotion regulation, regret avoidance, goal setting) are
involved.
Limitations and Future Directions
Our review did not cover all the factors that could potentially
influence memory after choice. Given our necessarily restrictive
eligibility criteria, we left out studies based on information
provision after choice (e.g., hindsight bias and misinformation
effects) and investigations based on the self-selection of
information before choice. Another limitation is represented by
the fact that the reviewed studies used a variety of methods and
materials, which may have affected the specific results obtained in
specific circumstances. For this reason, we included an analysis of
potentially moderating factors, as a first step toward a systematic
experimental appraisal of their role.
Our extensive search for published and unpublished studies
on misremembering after a deliberate choice between options
described by multiple attributes yielded a surprisingly low
amount of papers, and pointed to several gaps in the literature.
A fundamental question that remains to be answered is whether
choice-supportive memory can be shown to be a robust
phenomenon even in studies not focusing on misattribution
and not testing only recognition memory. More research is also
needed both on the temporal aspect of distortions (at encoding,
during memory consolidation or retention, at retrieval), on
the relative contribution and type of cognitive and socio-
emotional processes involved, and on their interactions. This
implies setting up studies specifically targeting the time-course of
choice-related misremembering and their underlying processes,
using both experimental and individual-difference approaches,
eventually together with neuroimaging investigations capable
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of highlighting the cognitive and affective development of
processing. It would also be interesting to explore choice-
supportive memory in clinical populations (e.g., in patients with
damage to the orbitofrontal cortex vs. the dorsolateral cortex
vs. different areas in the temporal lobe, and in patients with
autism spectrum disorder or alexithymia) to help unveiling the
processes involved, and in children and adolescents to elucidate
the developmental aspect.
Research on individual differences would also be useful
to elucidate the relationships between individual differences
in cognition, motivation, emotion and choice-supportive
memory, as this could provide useful information about
potential explanations of choice-supportive misremembering.
For example, if individual differences in need for closure
and rumination or regret were found to correlate with the
degree of choice-supportiveness, this would lend support to the
importance of motivational or emotional factors. Conversely,
correlations between the degree of choice-supportiveness and
the effectiveness of recollection measures would support a more
cognitive account.
As a final issue, it would be useful to understand to what extent
choice-supportive memory can lead to suboptimal decisions in
repeated (or related/similar) future memory-based or mixed
decisions (Chen and Zhang, 2003) and how it is connected
to emotional balance, self-esteem and life satisfaction, in order
to properly weigh the relative costs and benefits of choice-
supportive misremembering. Just as it is important to assess
the behavioral consequences of false memories (e.g., Bernstein
et al., 2005; Laney et al., 2008), a better understanding of
the behavioral influence of choice-supportive misremembering
over time would be fruitful. Along this line of investigation,
individual differences in proneness to different types of choice-
supportive misremembering could also be examined in relation
to personality variables to appraise when a normal and even
adaptive degree of self-deception turns into a dangerous and
delusional alteration of reality.
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